On the Approximability of Presidential Type Predicates by Huang, Neng & Potechin, Aaron
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
04
45
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
C]
  9
 Ju
l 2
01
9
On the Approximability of Presidential Type Predicates
Neng Huang∗ Aaron Potechin†
July 11, 2019
Abstract
Given a predicate P : {−1, 1}k → {−1, 1}, let CSP(P ) be the set of constraint satisfaction
problems whose constraints are of the form P . We say that P is approximable if given a nearly
satisfiable instance of CSP(P ), there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that does
better than a random assignment. Otherwise, we say that P is approximation resistant.
In this paper, we analyze presidential type predicates, which are balanced linear threshold
functions where all of the variables except the first variable (the president) have the same weight.
We show that almost all presidential-type predicates P are approximable. More precisely, we
prove the following result: for any δ0 > 0, there exists a k0 such that if k ≥ k0, δ ∈ (δ0, 1− 2/k],
and δk+k−1 is an odd integer then the presidential-type predicate P (x) = sign(δkx1+
∑
k
i=2
xi)
is approximable.
1 Introduction
In constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs), we have a set of constraints and we want to satisfy as
many of them as possible. Many fundamental problems in computer science are CSPs, including
3-SAT, MAX CUT, k-colorability, and unique games.
One fundamental question about CSPs is as follows. For a given type of CSP, is there a
randomized polynomial time algorithm which is significantly better than randomly guessing an
assignment? More precisely, letting r be the expected proportion of constraints satisfied by a
random assignment, is there an ǫ > 0 and a randomized polynomial time algorithm A such that
given a CSP instance where at least (1− ǫ) of the constraints can be satisfied, A returns an x which
satisfies at least (r + ǫ) of the constraints in expectation? If so, we say that this type of CSP is
approximable. If not, then we say that this type of CSP is approximation resistant.
For example, H˚astad’s 3-bit PCP theorem [7] proves that 3-XOR instances (where every con-
straint is a linear equation modulo 2 over 3 variables) are NP-hard to approximate. A direct
corollary of H˚astad’s 3-bit PCP theorem is that 3-SAT is also NP-hard to approximate and this
theorem has served as the basis for numerous other inapproximability results. On the other hand,
Goemans and Williamson’s [4] breakthrough algorithm for MAX CUT, which gives an approxima-
tion ratio of .878 for MAX CUT, shows that MAX CUT is approximable as a random cut would
only cut half of the edges in expectation.
However, while the approximability or approximation resistance of CSPs has been extensively
investigated, there is still much that is unknown. In this paper, we investigate CSPs where every
constraint has the form of some fixed presidential-type predicate P . We show that for almost all
presidential-type predicates P , this type of CSP is approximable.
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1.1 Definitions
In order to better describe our results and their relationship to prior work, we need a few definitions.
Definition 1.1. A boolean predicate P of arity k is a function P : {−1, 1}k → {−1, 1}.
We remark that in general a predicate can be non-boolean.
Definition 1.2. A presidential type predicate is a boolean predicate of the form
P (x1, . . . , xk) = sign(a · x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xk),
where xi ∈ {−1, 1} for every i ∈ [k] and a = a(k) is a function on k that takes integer values such
that a+ k − 1 is an odd integer.
Remark 1.3. In the definition above we assume that a = a(k) takes only integer values. This is
not a serious restriction because if a is not an integer, then we can shift a up or down slightly to
find another presidential-type predicate with integer coefficient a′ which is equivalent to the original
predicate (see the appendix for a brief proof). We require a+ k − 1 to be odd in order to prevent a
tie.
We can think of the predicate as a vote where the vote of x1, the “president”, has weight a,
while votes of remaining voters, the “citizens”, have the same weight 1.
Remark 1.4. Note that presidential type predicates are balanced linear threshold functions, i.e.
functions of the form f(x) = sign(
∑k
i=1 cixi) where ∀i, ci ∈ R and ∀x ∈ {−1, 1}
k,
∑k
i=1 cixi 6= 0 (so
that the function is well-defined). Note that if a predicate P is a balanced linear threshold function,
P (−x) = −P (x) so exactly half of the assignments satisfy the predicate and thus a uniformly
random assignment has expected value 0.
Definition 1.5. Given a boolean predicate P : {−1, 1}k → {−1, 1}, an instance Φ of CSP(P )
consists of a set of n variables x1, . . . , xn and m constraints C1, . . . , Cm where each Ci has the form
Ci(xi1 , . . . , xik) = P (zi,1xi1 , . . . , zi,kxik)
for some i1, . . . , ik ∈ [n] and zi,1 . . . zi,k ∈ {−1, 1}.
Definition 1.6. A boolean predicate P is approximable if there exists a constant ǫ > 0 and a
polynomial time algorithm, possibly randomized, that on input Φ ∈ CSP(P ) such that OPT(Φ) ≥
1 − ǫ, produces an assignment to Φ’s variables that in expectation satisfies rP + ǫ fraction of the
constraints in Φ, where rP = Ex∈{−1,1}k [(1 + P (x))/2] is the probability that a constraint in Φ is
satisfied by a random assignment. Otherwise, we say P is approximation resistant.
We say that a boolean predicate P is weakly approximable if there exists a constant ǫ > 0 and a
polynomial time algorithm, possibly randomized, that on input Φ ∈ CSP(P ) such that OPT(Φ) ≥
1 − ǫ, produces an assignment to Φ’s variables that in expectation either satisfies at least rP + ǫ
fraction of the constraints in Φ or satisfies at most rP−ǫ fraction of the constraints in Φ. Otherwise,
we say that P is strongly approximation resistant.
Remark 1.7. For presidential-type predicates, and in fact any odd predicate P (i.e. a predicate
P where P (−x) = −P (x)), the notions of being approximable and being weakly approximable are
equivalent.
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1.2 Our Result
In this paper, we prove the following result.
Theorem 1.8. For any δ0 > 0, there exists a k0 ∈ N such that if k ≥ k0, δ ∈ (δ0, 1 − 2/k], and
δk + k − 1 is an odd integer then the presidential-type predicate
P (x) = sign
(
δkx1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
is approximable.
Remark 1.9. If δ > 1− 2/k and δk + k − 1 is an odd integer, then δk ≥ k. This means that the
predicate becomes a dictator predicate, which is trivially approximable and not very interesting.
1.3 Relationship to Prior Work
We now describe known criteria for determining whether a predicate P is approximable or approx-
imation resistant and how our techniques compare to these criteria.
In 2008, Raghavendra [10] gave a characterization of which predicates are approximable and
which predicates are approximation resistant. Raghavendra showed that either a standard semidef-
inite program (SDP) together with an appropriate rounding scheme gives a better approximation
ratio than a random assignment or it is unique games hard to do so (see section 2.2). However,
this characterization leaves much to be desired because for a given predicate, it can be extremely
hard to tell which case holds. In fact, it is not even known to be decidable!
Khot, Tulsiani, and Worah [8] gave a characterization of which predicates are weakly approx-
imable which is based on whether there exist certain vanishing measures over a polytope which
we call the KTW polytope. Unfortunately, it is also unknown whether this characterization is
decidable.
Thus, if we want to determine if a given predicate P is approximable or approximation resistant,
it is often better to use more direct criteria. For showing that predicates are hard to approximate,
the following criterion, proved by Austrin and Mossel [2], is extremely useful.
Definition 1.10. We say that a predicate P has a balanced pairwise independent distribution of
solutions if there exists a distribution D on {−1, 1}k such that
1. D is supported on {x ∈ {−1, 1}k : P (x) = 1} (D is a distribution of solutions to P )
2. For all i ∈ [k], Ex∈D[xi] = 0 and for all i < j ∈ [k], Ex∈D[xixj] = 0
Theorem 1.11. If P has a balanced pairwise independent distribution of solutions then P is unique
games hard to approximate.
This criterion captures most but not all predicates which are known to be unique games hard
to approximate. One example of a predicate which is not captured by this criterion is the predicate
which was recently constructed by Potechin [9] which is unique games hard to approximate and is
a balanced linear threshold function. 1
For approximation resistance which does not rely on the hardness of unique games, Chan [3]
gave the following stricter criterion which implies NP-hardness of approximation.
1There were previously known predicates, such as the GLST predicate [5] P (x1, x2, x3, x4) =
1+x1
2
x2x3+
1−x1
2
x2x4,
which are unique games hard (in fact NP-hard) to approximate yet do not have a balanced pairwise independent
distribution of solutions. However, the hardness of these predicates can be reduced to the hardness of predicates
which do have a balanced pairwise independent distribution of solutions, so Austrin and Mossel’s criterion can still
be used for these predicates.
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Theorem 1.12. If a predicate P has a balanced pairwise independent subgroup of solutions then
P is NP-hard to approximate.
For showing that predicates are approximable, the general technique is as follows:
1. Run Raghavendra’s SDP to obtain biases {bi : i ∈ [n]} and pairwise biases {bij : i < j ∈ [n]}
for the variables
2. Construct a rounding scheme which takes these biases and pairwise biases and gives us a
solution x such that if the SDP “thinks” that almost all of the constraints are satisfiable then
x satisfies significantly more constraints than a random assignment in expectation.
Based on rounding schemes which are essentially linear in the biases and pairwise biases, Hast [6]
obtained the following criterion for when predicates are approximable:
Theorem 1.13 (Hast’s criterion). Given a predicate P : {−1,+1}k → {−1,+1},
1. Define P1 : {−1,+1}
k → R to be P1(x) =
∑k
i=1 Pˆ{i}xi
2. Define P2 : {−1,+1}
k → R to be P2(x) =
∑k−1
i=1
∑k
j=i+1 Pˆ{i,j}xixj.
If there are constants c1, c2 such that c2 ≥ 0 and c1P1(x)+ c2P2(x) > 0 for all x such that P (x) = 1
then P is approximable.
Aside from Hast’s criterion, most of the known approximability results are ad-hoc. Some such
results are as follows.
1. Austrin, Benabbas, and Magen [1] showed that the monarchy predicate P (x1, · · · , xk) =
sign((k − 2)x1 +
∑k
i=2 xi) is approximable and that any predicate P which is a balanced
symmetric quadratic threshold function is approximable.
2. Potechin [9] showed that the almost monarchy predicate P (x1, · · · , xk) = sign((k − 4)x1 +∑k
i=2 xi) is approximable for sufficiently large k.
In this paper, we prove that almost all presidential-type predicates are approximable by gener-
alizing the ideas Potechin [9] used to prove that the almost monarchy predicate is approximable
for sufficiently large k and making these ideas more systematic. Our work compares to previous
criteria as follows.
1. Raghavendra’s criterion and the KTW criterion give a space of rounding schemes which should
be considered but don’t provide an efficient way to search for the best rounding scheme in
this space. For our techniques, we take full advantage of this space of rounding schemes while
also providing a way to systematically construct the rounding scheme which we need.
2. Like Hast’s criterion, we need to check that a certain expression is positive for all x such
that P (x) = 1. However, there are two key differences between our techniques and Hast’s
criterion. First, as noted above, we use a larger space of rounding schemes. In particular,
we use rounding schemes which are very much non-linear in the biases and pairwise biases.
Second, because these rounding schemes are nonlinear in the biases and pairwise biases, it is
actually not quite enough to check all x such that P (x) = 1. Instead, we need to check over
the entire KTW polytope.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some techniques that are crucial in our proof.
2.1 Fourier Analysis
In this paper, we will make extensive use of the Fourier expansion of boolean predicates. The
Fourier expansion of a boolean predicate f is of the following form
f(x) =
∑
I⊂[k]
fˆIxI ,
where xI =
∏
i∈I xi and {fˆI : I ⊆ [k]} are the Fourier coefficients fˆI = Ex∈{−1,1}k [f(x)xI ] of f .
We have the following lemma for the Fourier coefficients, the proof of which can be found in the
appendix.
Lemma 2.1 (Fourier coefficients of presidential type predicates). Let f(x1, . . . , xk) = sign(a · x1+
x2 + · · ·+ xk) be a presidential type predicate where a ≤ k − 2 and a+ k − 1 is an odd integer. Let
fˆtC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens (indices from 2 to k) and fˆP+tC denote the
Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens together with the president (index 1). Let τ = ⌊(k−a−1)/2⌋.
We have
(1) fˆP = 1−
1
2k−2
∑τ
l=0
(
k−1
l
)
,
(2) fˆtC =
1
2k−2
∑τ
i=0
∑τ−i
j=0(−1)
j
(
k−t−1
i
)(
t
j
)
, ∀t(1 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 ∧ t is odd),
(3) fˆP+tC = −
1
2k−2
∑τ
i=0
∑τ−i
j=0(−1)
j
(
k−t−1
i
)(
t
j
)
, ∀t(2 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 ∧ t is even).
2.2 The Standard SDP for CSPs
In this subsection we briefly describe Raghavendra’s SDP [10], which together with an appropriate
rounding scheme approximates a given CSP in polynomial time as long as the CSP is not unique
games hard to approximate. Note that Raghavendra [10] considered CSPs for general constraints
but for our discussion here we will focus only on boolean predicates.
Before that, we first define the KTW polytope, which plays a crucial role in Khot, Tulsiani and
Worah’s [8] characterization of which predicates are weakly approximable.
Definition 2.2. Given x ∈ {−1, 1}k, let p(x) ∈ {−1, 1}k+(
k
2) be the vector obtained by concatenating
x and (x1x2, x1x3, . . . , xk−1xk). Define
KTWf = CH({p(x) | x ∈ {−1, 1}
k , f(x) = 1}),
where f : {−1, 1}k → {−1, 1} is a boolean predicate and CH(S) is the convex hull of S.
Given a CSP instance on n variables x1, . . . , xn and m constraints C1, . . . , Cm, the SDP searches
for biases {bi} and pairwise biases {bij} whose intended meanings are bi = E[xi], bij = E[xixj].
Then, for each constraint Ci, it searches for a local distribution on the variables in Ci which agrees
with the global biases and pairwise biases and maximizes the probability that Ci is satisfied. The
goal of the SDP is to find global biases and pairwise biases such that the sum of these satisfying
probabilities is maximized.
Let ALLk = CH({p(x) | x ∈ {−1, 1}
k}). For a polytope A and a real number r, define
rA = {rx | x ∈ A}. We take the following formal definition of the SDP from [9].
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Definition 2.3. Let Φ be a CSP instance on n variables x1, . . . , xn and m constraints C1, . . . , Cm.
The standard SDP for Φ has the following variables.
• aCi,1, aCi,2, pCi,1, pCi,2 for each constraint Ci.
• bi for each variable xi and bij for each pair of variables xi, xj where i < j.
Let B is the square matrix indexed by {0, 1, . . . , n} such that
• Bii = 1 for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
• B0i = Bi0 = bi for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• Bij = Bji = bij for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that i < j.
The SDP maximizes
∑m
i=1 aCi subject to the following constraints:
1. B  0.
2. For every constraint Ci on variables xj1 , . . . , xjki , where ki is the arity of Ci.
(a) aCi ∈ [0, 1].
(b) pCi,1 ∈ aCiKTWCi, pCi,2 ∈ (1− aCi)ALLki .
(c) pCi,1 + pCi,2 = (bj1 , bj2 , . . . , bjki , bj1bj2 , . . . , bjki−1bjki ).
Raghavendra showed in [10] that if for all ǫ > 0, this SDP fails to distinguish instances of
CSP(P ) where (1− ǫ) fraction of the constraints are satisfiable from instances of CSP(P ) where at
most (rP+ǫ) fraction of the constraints are satisfiable, then P is unique games hard to approximate.
Conversely, if this SDP does distinguish between these two cases for some ǫ > 0 then P can be
approximated by this SDP followed by a rounding scheme. Thus, assuming the unique games
conjecture (or at least that unique games is hard), if a predicate is approximable then it can be
approximated by running this SDP followed by a rounding scheme.
2.3 Approximation Algorithms for Predicates
To approximate a given instance Φ ∈ CSP(P ) where P is a presidential type predicate, the first
step of our approximation algorithm is running the standard SDP to obtain biases {bi} and pairwise
biases {bij}. We then probabilistically choose values for xi according to these biases. Our goal is
to have
E[P (x)] = E

∑
I⊂[k]
PˆIxI

 = ∑
I⊂[k]
PˆIE [xI ] ≥ ǫ,
where ǫ > 0 is a constant depending only on P .
To achieve this goal, we will choose the expected value E[xI ] of each monomial xI . However,
we do not have complete freedom for these choices. Intuitively, E[xI ] should obey the following
constraints:
1. E[xI ] is a function of {bi | i ∈ I} and {bij | i, j ∈ I}.
2. E[xI ] is invariant under permutation of indices in I.
3. If we flip the sign of any variable xi where i ∈ I (by flipping the signs of bi and {bij : j ∈
I, j 6= i}), then the sign of E[xI ] should be flipped as well.
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It turns out that for determining whether a predicate P is weakly approximable (which is the
same as approximable for presidential-type predicates), these are the only constraints on E[xI ].
More precisely, we have the following theorem from [9], which is also implicit in [8]
Theorem 2.4 (Theorem 5.1 in [9]). Let {bi | i ∈ [k]} and {bij | i, j ∈ [k], i < j} be biases and
pairwise biases produced by the standard SDP. For every a ∈ [k], let fa : [−1, 1]
a+(a2) → [−1, 1] be
a continuous function satisfying the following symmetric requirements.
1. For all permutations σ ∈ Sa,
fa(biσ(1) , . . . , biσ(a) , biσ(1)iσ(2) , . . . , biσ(a−1)iσ(a)) = fa(bi1 , . . . , bia , bi1i2 , . . . , bia−1ia).
2. For all signs si1 , . . . , sia ∈ {−1, 1}
a,
fa(si1bi1 , . . . , siabia, si1si2bi1i2 , . . . , sia−1siabia−1ia) =

 a∏
j=1
sij

 fa(bi1 , . . . , bia , bi1i2 , . . . , bia−1ia).
Then there exists a sequence of rounding schemes {Rq} and coefficients {cq} such that for all subsets
I = {i1, . . . , ia} of size at most k,∑
q
cqERq [xI ] = fa(bi1 , . . . , bia , bi1i2 , . . . , bia−1ia),
where ERq [xI ] is the expected value of xI given by rounding scheme Rq. Moreover, this sum can be
taken to be globally convergent.
Remark 2.5. This theorem gives us a linear combination of rounding schemes. The coefficients
cq can be thought of as a probability distribution of rounding schemes, but there are two problems:
•
∑
q |cq| may not be 1. One fix to this issue is to scale f by an appropriate constant ǫ.
• cq may be negative. In general, this can be a real issue but here the predicates we consider are
odd, which means if cq is negative we can simply flip the rounding scheme and take it with
probability −cq.
Example 2.6. This theorem says the following about E[xi] and E[xixj].
• We can take E[xi] ∼ f1(bi) for any continuous function f1 such that f1(bi) = −f1(−bi) (i.e.
f1 is odd).
• We can take E[xixj] ∼ f2(bi, bj , bij) for any continuous function f2 such that f2(bi, bj , bij) =
f2(bj , bi, bij) = −f2(−bi, bj ,−bij). The first equality corresponds to exchanging i and j while
the second equality corresponds to flipping xi.
Example 2.7. Some examples of possible functions f3 are as follows:
1. We can take E[xixjxk] ∼ xixjxk
2. As discussed in the following subsections, we will take E[xixjxk] ∼ (bibjk + bjbik + bkbij)
3. Potechin [9] found a simpler rounding scheme for the monarchy predicate where E[xixjxk] ∼
sign(xixjxk)max{|xi|, |xj |, |xk|}
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2.4 Sums of Products of Biases and Pairwise Biases
In this subsection, we define some notations related to biases and pairwise biases. Note that similar
definitions were also used in [9].
Definition 2.8. We define α = b1 and β =
∑k
i=2 bi.
Definition 2.9. For E1 ⊆ [k] and E2 ⊆
(
[k]
2
)
, define
BE1,E2 =
∏
i∈E1
bi
∏
{i,j}∈E2
i<j
bij.
Definition 2.10. Let V = {α, i1, i2, . . . , ik−1}. Let H = H1 ∪H2 where H1 ⊆ V and H2 ⊆
(
V
2
)
.
Define
SH =
∑
E1,E2:∃σ:V→[k] bijective
σ(α)=1,σ(H1)=E1,σ(H2)=E2
BE1,E2 ,
where σ(H1) = {σ(i) | i ∈ H1}, σ(H2) = {{σ(i), σ(j)} | {i, j} ∈ H2}.
Intuitively, SH is the sum of products BE1,E2 where E1 ∪E2 has the form H. One particularly
important such sum in our algorithms is S{{i1,i2}}, which is the sum of pairwise biases with indices
in [2, k].
Definition 2.11. We define S{{i1,i2}} = E(1+∆) where E is a quantity depending on the predicate.
Remark 2.12. The value of E is taken to be the average of S(i1,i2) in the cases where the vote passes
with value 1. These cases are intuitively the most difficult cases to round because the contribution
of linear term is too small. For the predicates in our discussion, we always have E = Θ(k2).
Definition 2.13. We define the following shorthand notations for some important sums.
S1,l = S{i1,{i2,i3},{i4,i5},...,{i2l,i2l+1}},
S2,l = S{α,{i1,i2},{i3,i4},...,{i2l−1,i2l}},
S3,l = S{i1,{α,i2},{i3,i4},...,{i2l−1,i2l}}.
Example 2.14. In the case where k = 4, l = 1, we have
S1,l = b2b34 + b3b24 + b4b23,
S2,l = b1b23 + b1b24 + b1b34,
S3,l = b2b13 + b2b14 + b3b12 + b3b14 + b4b12 + b4b13.
Proposition 2.15. For every l ≥ 1,
l!
El
S1,l = β(1 +∆)
l −
S{i1,{i1,i2}}
E
l(1 + ∆)l−1 −
βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}
E2
l(l − 1)(1 + ∆)l−2 +O
(
1
k
)
,
l!
El
S2,l = α(1 + ∆)
l +O
(
1
k
)
,
l!
El
S3,l =
βS{{α,i1}}
E
l(1 + ∆)l−1 +O
(
1
k
)
,
where the hidden constants in big-O may depend on l.
The proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix.
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2.5 Our Technique
Our technique is a generalization of the technique from [9]. As we discussed earlier, our goal is to
have
E[f(x)] =
∑
I⊂[k]
fˆIE [xI ] > 0
for every given point in the KTW polytope. Note that if (b1, . . . , bk, b12, . . . , b(k−1)k) ∈ KTWf ,
then we have
a · b1 +
k∑
i=2
bi = a · α+ β ≥ 1.
The contribution of degree 1 terms in
∑
I⊆[k] fˆIE[XI ] is some multiple of fˆPα+ fˆCβ. For the two
kinds of presidential type predicates that we consider, it holds that fˆP is exponentially larger then
fˆC . So if we want to use the above inequality to get a positive value, we need more β from higher
degree terms.
By Theorem 2.4, for l ≥ 1, our rounding scheme can let the term xi1xi2 · · · xi2l+1 have bias
c2l+1
(
bi1bi2i3 · · · bi2li2l+1 + symmetric terms
)
,
where c2l+1 is a value that we have the freedom to choose. If we sum up the contribution from
degree 2l + 1 terms, we get∑
|I|=2l+1
fˆIE[XI ] = c2l+1
(
fˆ(2l+1)CS1,l + fˆP+(2l)C(S2,l + S3,l)
)
,
By Proposition 2.15, S1,l is approximately βE
l(1 + ∆)l/l!. We will choose a function h(t) =∑m
i=1 ait
i, which we call a rounding polynomial, and appropriate constants c2l+1 such that
m∑
l=1
∑
|I|=2l+1
fˆIE[XI ] =
m∑
l=1
c2l+1
(
fˆ(2l+1)CS1,l + fˆP+(2l)C(S2,l + S3,l)
)
≈
m∑
l=1
alβ(1+∆)
l = βh(1+∆).
We will choose h to be very close to 1 so that this approximately gives β. Together with the degree
1 terms, this will give a positive value for E[f ]. However, we have limited freedom in choosing the
polynomial h. Since h has no constant term, we must have h(0) = 0. We also need h(1) = 1 and
h′(1) = h′′(1) = 0. This is because the cases where ∆ is closed to 0 are the most difficult to round,
and we need the contribution to be as close to β as possible.
For quasi-monarchy predicates, which we analyze in the next section, the function h(1 + ∆) =
1+∆3 is sufficiently close to 1 for our purposes. The following graph shows the function h(1+∆) =
1 +∆3.
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∆multiple of β
h = 1 +∆3
1
0
0-1
Figure 1: Plot of h = 1 +∆3.
For approximating other presidential-type predicates, we will need h to remain close to 1 for a
wider range of ∆ (but not for ∆ < −1). To achieve this, we control the growth of h by introducing
an exponential factor, i.e., letting h(1 + ∆) = 1 + ∆3 exp(−B(1 + ∆)) for some constant B. We
then truncate the Taylor expansion of this function to get a rounding polynomial.
3 Warm-up: Quasi-monarchy Predicates
As a warm-up, we show that quasi-monarchy predicates are approximable by applying our tech-
niques in Section 2.5.
Definition 3.1. A quasi-monarchy predicate is a presidential type predicate of the form
f(x1, . . . , xk) = sign((k − 2c)x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xk),
where c is a positive integer.
Remark 3.2. Some special cases of quasi-monarchy predicates have been studied before. When
c = 1, we have the monarchy predicate which has been studied in [1] and [9]. When c = 2, we have
the almost monarchy predicate which has been studied in [9].
In this section, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. For every positive integer c, the quasi-monarchy predicate
f(x) = sign
(
(k − 2c)x1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
is approximable if k is sufficiently large.
Note that Theorem 3.3 follows from Theorem 1.8 by setting δ = 1−2c/k. We prove this theorem
as a special case because it’s a nice illustration of our techniques, and the rounding polynomial
used in this case is much simpler than the one used in Theorem 1.8.
3.1 Fourier Coefficients
We first calculate the Fourier coefficients. The following is a corollary from Lemma 2.1.
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Lemma 3.4. Let f(x1, . . . , xk) = sign((k − 2c) · x1 + x2 + · · · + xk) where c > 0 is a constant
integer. Let fˆtC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens and fˆP+tC denote the Fourier
coefficient of a set of t citizens together with the president. We have
fˆP = 1−
1
2k−2
c−1∑
l=0
(
k − 1
l
)
,
fˆtC =
1
2k−2(c− 1)!
(
kc−1 − (c− 1)
(
2t− 1 +
c
2
)
kc−2 +O(kc−3)
)
, t is an odd constant
fˆP+tC = −
1
2k−2(c− 1)!
(
kc−1 − (c− 1)
(
2t− 1 +
c
2
)
kc−2 +O(kc−3)
)
, t is an even constant
Proof. We have τ = ⌊(k − k + 2c− 1)/2⌋ = c− 1. It follows from Lemma 2.1 that
fˆP = 1−
1
2k−2
c−1∑
l=0
(
k − 1
l
)
,
fˆtC =
1
2k−2
c−1∑
i=0
c−1−i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k − t− 1
i
)(
t
j
)
, ∀t(1 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 ∧ t is odd),
fˆP+tC = −
1
2k−2
c−1∑
i=0
c−1−i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k − t− 1
i
)(
t
j
)
, ∀t(2 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 ∧ t is even).
We need to estimate the term
∑c−1
i=0
∑c−1−i
j=0 (−1)
j
(
k−t−1
i
)(
t
j
)
. Note that t here is a constant inde-
pendent of k, so the term
(
k−t−1
i
)(
t
j
)
is O(ki). When i = c− 1, we have
c−1−i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k − t− 1
i
)(
t
j
)
=
(
k − t− 1
c− 1
)
=
1
(c− 1)!
(
kc−1 − (c− 1) ·
2t+ c
2
kc−2 +O(kc−3)
)
.
When i = c− 2, we have
]
c−1−i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k − t− 1
i
)(
t
j
)
=
(
k − t− 1
c− 2
)
− t
(
k − t− 1
c− 2
)
=
1− t
(c− 2)!
(
kc−2 +O(kc−3)
)
.
When i < c− 2, we have
∑c−1−i
j=0 (−1)
j
(
k−t−1
i
)(
t
j
)
= O(kc−3). We conclude that
c−1∑
i=0
c−1−i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k − t− 1
i
)(
t
j
)
=
1
(c− 1)!
(
kc−1 − (c− 1) ·
2t+ c
2
kc−2 +O(kc−3)
)
+
1− t
(c− 2)!
(
kc−2 +O(kc−3)
)
=
1
(c− 1)!
(
kc−1 − (c− 1)
(
2t− 1 +
c
2
)
kc−2 +O(kc−3)
)
,
and the lemma follows.
Note that fˆP is exponentially larger than fˆC .
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3.2 Choosing the Rounding Scheme
As discussed in Remark 2.12, we take E to be the average of S{{i1,i2}} in the two cases where
(k − 2c)x1 +
∑k
i=2 xi = 1. In the case where x1 = 1, we have that c citizens also vote 1, so
S{{i1,i2}} =
(
c
2
)
+
(
k−1−c
2
)
− c(k − 1 − c). In the case where x1 = −1, we have that k − c citizens
vote 1, so S{{i1,i2}} =
(
k−c
2
)
+
(
c−1
2
)
− (c− 1)(k − c). The average of these two numbers is
1
2
((
c
2
)
+
(
c− 1
2
))
+
1
2
((
k − 1− c
2
)
+
(
k − c
2
))
−
1
2
(c(k − 1− c) + (c− 1)(k − c))
=
(c− 1)2
2
+
(k − c− 1)2
2
− c(k − c) +
k
2
=
1
2
(c2 − 2c+ 1 + k2 − 2kc− 2k + c2 + 2c+ 1− 2ck + 2c2 + k)
=
1
2
(k2 − (4c + 1)k + 4c2 + 2)
Definition 3.5. Let E = 12(k
2 − (4c+ 1)k + 4c2 + 2).
Consider the following rounding scheme, which is the same as that used in [9] for the almost
monarchy predicate.
1. After rounding, xi will have bias
(k − (c− 1)(c/2 + 1))(k − 2c)ǫ
fˆP
· bi.
2. After rounding, xi1xi2xi3 will have bias
3ǫ2k−2(c− 1)!
Ekc−2
· (bi1bi2i3 + bi2bi1i3 + bi3bi1i2)
3. After rounding, xi1xi2xi3xi4xi5 will have bias
−6ǫ2k−2(c− 1)!
E2kc−2
· (bi1bi2i3bi4i5 + symmetric terms)
4. After rounding, xi1xi2xi3xi4xi5xi6xi7 will have bias
6ǫ2k−2(c− 1)!
E3kc−2
· (bi1bi2i3bi4i5bi6i7 + symmetric terms)
We prove Theorem 3.3 by showing that this rounding scheme achieves a positive value. Let h
be the following rounding polynomial:
h(x) = 3x− 3x2 + x3.
It is easy to verify that h(1 + ∆) = 1 + ∆3. The coefficients in our rounding scheme are chosen
to match this polynomial. As mentioned in Remark 2.5, we have a factor of ǫ in our coefficients
because of some technicality issues, and we will ignore it in the following analysis.
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3.3 Evaluating the Rounding Scheme
We calculate the contribution of terms by their degrees as follows (recall the definitions of S1,l, S2,l, S3,l
from Definition 2.13).
• Degree 3 terms. Their contribution is
3 · 2k−2(c− 1)!
Ekc−2
(
fˆ3CS1,1 + fˆP+2C(S2,1 + S3,1)
)
= 3
((
k − (c− 1)
(
5 +
c
2
)
+O
(
1
k
))
·
(
β(1 + ∆)−
S{i1,{i1,i2}}
E
+O
(
1
k
))
−
(
k − (c− 1)
(
3 +
c
2
)
+O
(
1
k
))
·
(
α(1 + ∆) +
βS{{α,i1}}
E
+O
(
1
k
)))
= k
(
3(β − α)(1 + ∆)−
3S{i1,{i1,i2}}
E
−
3βS{{α,i1}}
E
)
− 3(c− 1)
(
5 +
c
2
)
β(1 + ∆) +O(1).
• Degree 5 terms. We can similarly compute that their contribution is
−6 · 2k−2(c− 1)!
E2kc−2
(
fˆ5CS1,2 + fˆP+4C(S2,2 + S3,2)
)
= k
(
−3(β − α)(1 + ∆)2 +
6S{i1,{i1,i2}}
E
(1 + ∆) +
6βS{{α,i1}}
E
(1 + ∆) +
6βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}
E2
)
+ 3(c− 1)
(
9 +
c
2
)
β(1 + ∆)2 +O(1).
• Degree 7 terms. We can similarly compute that their contribution is
6 · 2k−2(c− 1)!
E3kc−2
(
fˆ7CS1,3 + fˆP+6C(S2,3 + S3,3)
)
= k
(
(β − α)(1 + ∆)3 −
3S{i1,{i1,i2}}
E
(1 + ∆)2 −
3βS{{α,i1}}
E
(1 + ∆)2 −
6βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}
E2
(1 + ∆)
)
− (c− 1)
(
13 +
c
2
)
β(1 + ∆)3 +O(1).
Summing these contributions up, we get
k
(
(β − α)h(1 + ∆)−
S{i1,(i1,i2)}
E
h′(1 + ∆)−
βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}
E2
h′′(1 + ∆)−
βS(α,i1)}
E
h′(1 + ∆)
)
− (c− 1)(c/2 + 1)βh(1 + ∆)− 4(c− 1)β(1 + ∆)h′(1 + ∆) +O(1)
= k(β − α)h(1 + ∆)− (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
)
βh(1 + ∆) +O(k)|∆| +O(1).
Here we used the fact that the terms
S{i1,(i1,i2)}
E
,
βS{(i1,i2),(i1,i3)}
E2
,
βS(α,i1)}
E
are O(1) and h′(1) =
h′′(1) = 0. Now we add in the contribution from the degree 1 terms, which is(
(k − (c− 1)(c/2 + 1))(k − 2c)
fˆP
)
·
(
fˆPα+ fˆCβ
)
=
(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
))
(k − 2c)α +
(k − (c− 1)(c/2 + 1))(k − 2c)fˆC
fˆP
· β.
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We know from Lemma 3.4 that fˆP is exponentially larger than fˆC . This means that we can assume
that we are adding in a multiple of α and ignore the multiple of β which is exponentially smaller.
Suppose we add in (k − (c− 1)(c/2 + 1))(k − 2c)α, then we will get(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
))
(k − 2c)α + k(β − α)h(1 + ∆)− (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
)
βh(1 + ∆) +O(k)|∆|+O(1)
=
(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
))
((k − 2c)α + β) + kβ(h(1 + ∆)− 1) +O(k)|∆|+O(1)
=
(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
))
((k − 2c)α + β) + kβ∆3 +O(k)|∆| +O(1).
To show that the above quantity is positive, we need the following lemma, which we will prove
at the end of this section.
Lemma 3.6. For sufficiently large k we have
(k − 2c)α + β ≥
(k − 4c)|∆|
3
+
1
3
.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We have two cases.
• ∆ ≥ −0.55. Then ∆2 ≤ 0.3025. Applying Lemma 3.6, we have that the value of our rounding
scheme is
≥
(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
))((k − 4c)|∆|
3
+
1
3
)
+ kβ∆3 +O(k)|∆|+O(1)
=
1
3
(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
))
+
((
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
)) (k − 4c)
3
+O(k)
)
|∆|+ kβ∆3 +O(1).
Since ∆2 < 1/3, we have
(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
)) (k − 4c)
3
|∆| ≥ |kβ∆3|.
Also, if we let k be sufficiently large, then the O(k) term will be dominated by the preceding
k2 term, which means the value of our rounding scheme will be positive.
• ∆ < −0.55, then we know that α is positive2 and we can write the dominating terms of the
value in our rounding scheme as(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
))
((k − 2c)α + β) + kβ∆3 +O(k)|∆|+O(1)
=
(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
))
((k − 2c)α + β) (1 + ∆3)−
(
k − (c− 1)
( c
2
+ 1
))
(k − 2c)α∆3
+O(k)|∆|+O(1).
The second term is positive and is Ω(k2). The first term is non-negative when ∆ ≥ −1. If
∆ < −1, since ∆ > −1−O(1/k), we know that 1+∆3 is on the order of O(1/k), which means
that even if the first term could be negative, it is dominated by the second term. Either way,
the O(k)|∆| + O(1) term will be dominated. So if k is set to be a sufficiently large number,
we will get a positive value.
2If x1 = −1, the minimum value of ∆ is about 0. If x1 = 1, then minimum value of ∆ is about −1. This means
that if ∆ < −0.55, with probability > 0.5 we have x1 = 1, which implies α > 0.
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This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Since ∆ is a convex function on the KTW polytope, it suffices to check that
for each satisfying assignment (k − 2c)α + β ≥ (k−4c)|∆|3 +
1
3 . Let t be the number of ones in
x2, . . . , xk, then we have β = t− (k − 1− t) = 2t− k + 1 and
∑
2≤i<j
xixj =
(
t
2
)
+
(
k − 1− t
2
)
− t(k − 1− t) = 2t2 − 2(k − 1)t+
(
k − 1
2
)
,
which implies that
∆ =
∑
2≤i<j xixj − E
E
=
1
E
(
2t2 − 2(k − 1)t− k + 2ck − 2c2
)
.
Since E = 12(k
2 − (4c + 1)k + 4c2 + 2) ≥ 12(k
2 − (4c + 1)k + 4c) = (k−1)(k−4c)2 , we have
(k − 4c)|∆|
3
=
(k − 4c)
3E
∣∣2t2 − 2(k − 1)t− k + 2ck − 2c2∣∣
≤
2
3(k − 1)
∣∣2t2 − 2(k − 1)t− k + 2ck − 2c2∣∣
=
2
3
∣∣∣∣ 2t2k − 1 − 2t− kk − 1 + 2ckk − 1 − 2c
2
k − 1
∣∣∣∣
=
2
3
∣∣∣∣ 2t2k − 1 − 2c
2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− (2t− 2c+ 1)
∣∣∣∣ .
To establish our lemma, we will show that
(k − 2c)α+ β ≥
2
3
(
2t2
k − 1
−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− (2t− 2c+ 1)
)
+
1
3
and
(k − 2c)α+ β ≥ −
2
3
(
2t2
k − 1
−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− (2t− 2c+ 1)
)
+
1
3
.
• (k − 2c)α + β ≥ 23
(
2t2
k−1 −
2c2
k−1 +
2c−1
k−1 − (2t− 2c+ 1)
)
+ 13 .
We have two cases, x1 = 1 or x1 = −1. If x1 = 1, then we have (k − 2c)x1 +
∑k
i=2 xi =
(k − 2c) + (2t− k + 1) = 2t− 2c+ 1 ≥ 1, which means t ≥ c (at least c citizens vote 1). The
inequality becomes
2t− 2c+ 1 ≥
2
3
(
2t2
k − 1
−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− (2t− 2c+ 1)
)
+
1
3
,
which is equivalent to
2t2
k − 1
− 5t−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
+ 5c− 2 ≤ 0.
The left hand side of the above inequality is a quadratic function on t where c ≤ t ≤ k − 1.
To check it’s non-positive, we check its values when t = c and t = k − 1. When t = c, the
value of LHS is 2c−1
k−1 − 2, which is negative when k is sufficiently large. When t = k − 1, its
value is −3(k − 1)− 2c
2
k−1 +
2c−1
k−1 + 5c− 2 ≤ 0.
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If x1 = −1, then we have (k−2c)x1+
∑k
i=2 xi = (2c−k)+(2t−k+1) = 2c−2(k− t)+1 ≥ 1,
which means t ≥ k − c (at least k − c citizens vote 1). The inequality becomes
2c− 2(k − t) + 1 ≥
2
3
(
2t2
k − 1
−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− (2t− 2c+ 1)
)
+
1
3
,
which is in turn equivalent to
2t2
k − 1
− 5t−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
+ 3k − c− 2 ≤ 0.
Again, we check whether LHS is non-positive when t = k− c and t = k− 1. When t = k− c,
LHS is equal to
2(k − c)2
k − 1
− 5(k − c)−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
+ 3k − c− 2
=
1
k − 1
(
2(k − c)2 − 5(k − c)(k − 1)− 2c2 + 2c− 1 + (3k − c− 2)(k − 1)
)
=
1
k − 1
(
2(k2 − 2ck + c2)− 5(k2 − ck − k + c)− 2c2 + 2c− 1 + 3k2 − 3k − ck + c− 2k + 2
)
=
1
k − 1
(−2c+ 1)
< 0.
When t = k − 1, LHS is equal to − 2c
2
k−1 +
2c−1
k−1 − c+ 1 < 0.
• (k − 2c)α + β ≥ −23
(
2t2
k−1 −
2c2
k−1 +
2c−1
k−1 − (2t− 2c+ 1)
)
+ 13 .
We again have two cases on x1. If x1 = 1, then the inequality becomes
2t− 2c+ 1 ≥ −
2
3
(
2t2
k − 1
−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− (2t− 2c+ 1)
)
+
1
3
,
which is equivalent to
2t2
k − 1
+ t−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− c ≥ 0.
The left hand side is a quadratic function that achieves its minimum when t is negative, so
we simply need to check its value at t = c, which is 2c−1
k−1 ≥ 0.
If x1 = −1, then the inequality becomes
2c− 2(k − t) + 1 ≥ −
2
3
(
2t2
k − 1
−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− (2t− 2c+ 1)
)
+
1
3
,
which is in turn equivalent to
2t2
k − 1
+ t−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− 3k + 5c ≥ 0.
The left hand side is again a quadratic function that achieves its minimum when t is negative.
We check its value at t = k − c, which is
2(k − c)2
k − 1
+ k − c−
2c2
k − 1
+
2c− 1
k − 1
− 3k + 5c
16
=
1
k − 1
(
2(k2 − 2ck + c2) + (k2 − ck − k + c)− 2c2 + 2c− 1− 3k2 + 3k + 5ck − 5c
)
=
1
k − 1
(2k − 2c− 1)
≥ 0.
This completes our proof.
4 Proof of Theorem 1.8
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.8.
Theorem 1.8 (Restated). For any δ0 > 0, there exists a k0 ∈ N such that if k ≥ k0, δ ∈ (δ0, 1−2/k],
and δk + k − 1 is an odd integer then the presidential-type predicate
P (x) = sign
(
δkx1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
is approximable.
4.1 Evaluating the Rounding Scheme
In this subsection, we evaluate how well our rounding scheme will do with a given polynomial h.
We will then use this to choose the polynomial h in the next subsection.
We have the following lemma for Fourier coefficients, the proof of which can be found in the
appendix.
Lemma 4.1. Let f(x1, . . . , xk) = sign(δ · kx1 + x2+ · · ·+ xk) where δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δk+ k− 1
is an odd integer. Let u = 1+δ2 k and v =
1−δ
2 k. Let fˆtC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t
citizens and fˆP+tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens together with the president.
We have
fˆP = 1−
1
2k−2
v−1∑
l=0
(
k − 1
l
)
,
fˆtC =
1
2k−2
·
(k − t− 1)!
(u− 1)!(v − 1)!
(
δt−1kt−1 −
(t− 1)(t− 2)
2
δt−3kt−2 +O(kt−3)
)
, t is an odd constant
fˆP+tC = −
1
2k−2
·
(k − t− 1)!
(u− 1)!(v − 1)!
(
δt−1kt−1 −
(t− 1)(t− 2)
2
δt−3kt−2 +O(kt−3)
)
, t is an even constant
where the constants inside the big Os depend on t but not on δ.
Remark 4.2. Since the constants inside the big Os do not depend on δ, we can allow δ to depend
on k as long as δ ∈ (0, 1). In particular, we can take δ = 1− 2c
k
for any constant c ≥ 1.
We need to choose the value of E (recall that S{{i1,i2}} = E(1 + ∆)). The two most difficult
cases to round (where δkα+ b = 1) are the following.
• The president and 1−δ2 k citizens vote 1, others vote −1. In this case
∑
2≤i<j xixj =
(1−δ)2
2 k
2−
(1− δ)k(k − 1) +
(
k−1
2
)
.
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• The president and 1+δ2 k citizens vote −1, others vote 1. In this case
∑
2≤i<j xixj =
(1+δ)2
2 k
2−
(1 + δ)k(k − 1) +
(
k−1
2
)
.
Taking the average of these two cases we have E = δ
2k2
2 −
k
2 +1. Since δ > δ0 is at least a constant,
we have E = Ω(k2).
As before, we will choose a rounding polynomial h for our rounding scheme. For this proof, we
will analyze the value of our rounding scheme in terms of h and defer the choice of h till later.
Assume that we have h(x) =
∑m
l=1 alx
l and coefficients
c2l+1 = al ·
2k−2(u− 1)!(v − 1)!
(k − 2l − 2)!δ2lk2l−1El
for degree 2l + 1 terms in our rounding scheme. The contribution of degree ≥ 3 terms is
m∑
l=1
∑
|I|=2l+1
fˆIE[XI ]
=
m∑
l=1
c2l+1
(
fˆ(2l+1)CS1,l + fˆP+(2l)C(S2,l + S3,l)
)
=
m∑
l=1
al
((
k − l(2l − 1)δ−2 +O
(
1
k
))
·
(
β(1 + ∆)l −
S{i1,{i1,i2}}
E
l(1 + ∆)l−1 −
βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}
E2
l(l − 1)(1 + ∆)l−2 +O
(
1
k
))
−
(
1−
2l + 1
k
)
·
(
k
δ
−
(l − 1)(2l − 1)
δ3
+O
(
1
k
))
·
(
α(1 + ∆)l +
βS{{α,i1}}
E
l(1 + ∆)l−1 +O
(
1
k
)))
=
m∑
l=1
al
(
k
(
β −
α
δ
)
(1 +∆)l −
l(2l − 1)β(1 + ∆)l
δ2
− k
(
S{i1,{i1,i2}}
E
l(1 + ∆)l−1 +
βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}
E2
l(l − 1)(1 +∆)l−2 +
βS{{α,i1}}
Eδ
l(1 +∆)l−1
)
+O(1)
)
= k
(
β −
α
δ
)
h(1 + ∆)−
2(1 + ∆)2βh′′(1 + ∆)
δ2
+
(1 +∆)βh′(1 + ∆)
δ2
− k
(
S{i1,{i1,i2}}
E
h′(1 + ∆) +
βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}
E2
h′′(1 + ∆) +
βS{{α,i1}}
Eδ
h′(1 + ∆)
)
+O(1)
We will choose h such that h′(1) = h′′(1) = 0, so the above becomes
k
(
β −
α
δ
)
h(1 + ∆) +O(k) ·∆+O(1).
Now we add in the contribution of degree 1 terms. Again, since fˆP is exponentially larger than
fˆC , we can safely assume that the contribution of degree 1 terms is a multiple of α. Suppose we
add (δk2 + k/δ)α, we get
k
(
β −
α
δ
)
h(1 + ∆) +
(
δk2 +
k
δ
)
α+O(k) ·∆+O(1). (∗)
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4.2 Choosing the Rounding Polynomial
We need to show that, by choosing h appropriately, (∗) is positive when k is sufficiently large. We
first show that h(x) = 1 − (1 − x)3 exp(−Bx) works for some constant B. However, the problem
with this function is that it’s not a polynomial. We will then show that by truncating the Taylor
expansion of this function we can get a polynomial which also works.
Lemma 4.3. Let h(x) = h1(x) = 1 − (1 − x)
3 exp(−Bx), where B = max
(
4
δ0
, 10.45 ln
4
δ20
)
. For
sufficiently large k, (∗) is always positive.
Here is a plot of h(1 + ∆) = 1 +∆3 exp(−B(1 + ∆)).
∆
multiple of β
h = 1 +∆3 exp(−B(1 +∆))
1
0
0-1
Figure 2: Plot of h = 1 +∆3 exp(−B(1 +∆)).
To prove Lemma 4.3, we need the following result.
Lemma 4.4. For sufficiently large k we have
δkα + β ≥
(δ2k − 1)|∆|
4
+
1
2
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.6. Since ∆ is a convex function on the KTW
polytope, it suffices to check that for each satisfying assignment, δkα+ β ≥ δk|∆|4 +
1
2 . Letting t be
the number of ones in x2, . . . , xk, we have that β = t− (k − 1− t) = 2t− k + 1 and
∑
2≤i<j
xixj =
(
t
2
)
+
(
k − 1− t
2
)
− t(k − 1− t) = 2t2 − 2(k − 1)t+
(
k − 1
2
)
,
Recalling that E = δ
2k2
2 −
k
2 + 1, this implies that
∆ =
∑
2≤i<j xixj − E
E
=
1
E
(
2t2 − 2(k − 1)t+
(
k − 1
2
)
−
δ2k2
2
+
k
2
− 1
)
=
1
E
(
2t2 − 2(k − 1)t+
(1− δ2)k2
2
− k
)
Since E > δ
2k2
2 −
k
2 , we have
δ2k − 1
4
|∆| =
δ2k − 1
4E
∣∣∣∣2t2 − 2(k − 1)t+ (1− δ2)k22 − k
∣∣∣∣
19
<
1
2k
∣∣∣∣2t2 − 2(k − 1)t+ (1− δ2)k22 − k
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ t2k − (k − 1)tk + (1− δ
2)k
4
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣
We will show that δkα + β ≥
∣∣∣ t2k − (k−1)tk + (1−δ2)k4 − 12 ∣∣∣ + 12 , from which our lemma will
follow. To this end, we show that δkα + β ≥
(
t2
k
− (k−1)t
k
+ (1−δ
2)k
4 −
1
2
)
+ 12 and δkα + β ≥
−
(
t2
k
− (k−1)t
k
+ (1−δ
2)k
4 −
1
2
)
+ 12 .
• δkα + β ≥
(
t2
k
− (k−1)t
k
+ (1−δ
2)k
4 −
1
2
)
+ 12 .
We have two cases, α = 1 or α = −1. If α = 1, then δkα+ β = δk + 2t− k + 1 and since it’s
a satisfying assignment we have t ≥ 1−δ2 k. The inequality becomes
t2
k
−
(k − 1)t
k
− 2t+
(1− δ2)k
4
− δk + k − 1 ≤ 0.
The left hand side is a quadratic function on t with positive leading coefficient, and to check
it’s non-positive we simply need to check its values on t = 1−δ2 k and t = k − 1, the boundary
points of t’s domain. When t = 1−δ2 k,
t2
k
−
(k − 1)t
k
− 2t+
(1− δ2)k
4
− δk + k − 1 =(
t2
k
− t+
(1− δ2)k
4
)
+ (−2t− δk + k) +
(
t
k
− 1
)
=(
(1− δ)2k
4
−
(1− δ)k
2
+
(1− δ2)k
4
)
+ 0 +
(
1− δ
2
− 1
)
=
1− δ
2
− 1 < 0
When t = k − 1,
t2
k
−
(k − 1)t
k
− 2t+
(1− δ2)k
4
− δk + k − 1 =(
t2
k
−
(k − 1)t
k
)
+ (−t+ k − 1) +
(
−t− δk +
(1− δ2)k
4
)
=
−
3− 4δ + δ2
4
k + 1
which is negative when k is sufficiently large (note that δ ≤ 1− 3
k
).
If α = −1, then δkα + β = −δk + 2t − k + 1 and we have that t ≥ 1+δ2 k. The inequality
becomes
t2
k
−
(k − 1)t
k
− 2t+
(1− δ2)k
4
+ δk + k − 1 ≤ 0.
We check the value of LHS on t = 1+δ
k
and t = k − 1. Following exactly the same argument
we used for α = 1 except that δ is replaced by −δ, when t = 1+δ2 k,
t2
k
−
(k − 1)t
k
− 2t+
(1− δ2)k
4
+ δk + k − 1 =
1 + δ
2
− 1 < 0
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and when t = k − 1,
t2
k
−
(k − 1)t
k
− 2t+
(1− δ2)k
4
+ δk + k − 1 = −
3− 4δ + δ2
4
k + 1 < 0
• δkα + β ≥ −
(
t2
k
− (k−1)t
k
+ (1−δ
2)k
4 −
1
2
)
+ 12 .
We again have two cases, α = 1 or α = −1. If α = 1, we have δkα+ β = δk + 2t− k+ 1 and
the inequality becomes
t2
k
+
(
2−
k − 1
k
)
t+
(1− δ2)k
4
+ δk − k ≥ 0.
The left hand side is a quadratic function that achieves minimum when t is negative, so we
simply need the inequality to hold when t = 1−δ2 k, at which point the value of LHS is
1−δ
2 ≥ 0.
If α = −1, the inequality becomes
t2
k
+
(
2−
k − 1
k
)
t+
(1− δ2)k
4
− δk − k ≥ 0.
Again, we simply need it to hold when t = 1+δ2 k, at which point the value of LHS is
1+δ
2 ≥ 0.
This completes our proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Note that the range of ∆ is approximately (−1−O(1/k), 1/δ2). We have the
following cases.
• ∆ ≥ −0.55. In this case we have
(∗) = k
(
β −
α
δ
)
h(1 + ∆) +
(
δk2 +
k
δ
)
α+O(k) ·∆+O(1)
= k(δkα + β) + k
(
β −
α
δ
)
(h(1 + ∆)− 1) +O(k) ·∆+O(1)
≥ k
(
(δ2k − 1)|∆|
4
+
1
2
)
+ k
(
β −
α
δ
)
(h(1 + ∆)− 1) +O(k) ·∆+O(1)
The last inequality is due to Lemma 4.4. Here the two quadratic terms are δ2k2|∆|/4 (note
that δ > δ0 is at least a constant) and kβ(h(1 + ∆)− 1). To show that the above is positive
when k is sufficiently large, it suffices to show that
δ20 |∆|
4
≥ |h(1 + ∆)− 1| = |∆3 exp(−B(1 + ∆))|,
that is,
∆2 exp(−B(1 + ∆)) ≤
δ20
4
.
Let g(∆) = ∆2 exp(−B(1 + ∆)), we have g′(∆) = ∆(2 − B∆) exp(−B(1 + ∆)). Since ∆ ≥
−0.55, the maximum of g is either g(−0.55) or g(2/B). Since B = max
(
4
δ0
, 10.45 ln
4
δ20
)
, we
have
g(2/B) =
4
B2
exp(−B − 2) ≤
4
B2
≤
4
(4/δ0)2
=
δ20
4
,
and
g(−0.55) = 0.552 exp(−0.45B) ≤ 0.552 ·
δ20
4
<
δ20
4
.
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• ∆ < −0.55. In this case, by the same reasoning as in Theorem 3.3, we have α > 0. We can
write (∗) as
(∗) = k(δkα + β)h(1 +∆) +
(
δk2 +
k
δ
)
α(1 − h(1 + ∆)) +O(k) ·∆+O(1).
If ∆ > −1, then both the first two terms are positive and Ω(k2). If ∆ ≤ −1, since ∆ ≥
−1 − O(1/k), we know that the first term is O(k), the second term is Ω(k2) and positive.
Either way, we get a positive value when k is sufficiently large.
Lemma 4.5. There exists m ∈ N such that, let h(x) = h2(x) = 1 − (1 − x)
3
∑m
l=0
(−Bx)l
l! where
B = max
(
4
δ
, 10.45 ln
4
δ2
)
, for sufficiently large k, (∗) is always positive.
Proof. Since the Taylor expansion of the exponential function is uniformly convergent3 on any
bounded interval, for any η > 0 we can choose m ∈ N such that for every ∆ ∈ [−2, 1/δ2].∣∣∣∣∣exp(−B(1 + ∆))−
m∑
l=0
(−B(1 + ∆))l
l!
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ η.
The difference of (∗) between h = h1 and h = h2 is
k
(
β −
α
δ
) ∣∣∣∣∣∆3
(
exp(−B(1 + ∆))−
m∑
l=0
(−B(1 +∆))l
l!
)∣∣∣∣∣+O(k) ·∆+O(1).
We have the same two cases as in Lemma 4.3.
• ∆ < −0.55. In this case, the same argument from Lemma 4.3 applies as well.
• ∆ ≥ 0.55. Note that in the previous proof of this case, we not only showed that (∗) is positive,
we also showed that the k2|∆| term has a positive coefficient. This means we can choose η to
be small enough such that
k
(
β −
α
δ
) ∣∣∣∣∣∆3
(
exp(−B(1 + ∆))−
m∑
l=0
(−B(1 + ∆))l
l!
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ k
(
β −
α
δ
)
|∆3|η
is dominated by the previous k2|∆| term. So we will end up with a positive value again.
By Lemma 4.5, if we choose h2 as the rounding polynomial, our rounding scheme will have a
positive expected value. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.8.
3For the notion of uniform convergence, see for example in [11]. The uniform convergence of the Taylor expansion
of exp(x) can be easily obtained by Weierstrass test.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we showed that almost all presidential type predicates are approximable. To do this,
we observed that if P is a presidential type predicate then P = sign(l) where l is a balanced linear
form. We then used high degree rounding schemes to approximate l over the entire KTW polytope.
This work raises a number of open questions, including the following:
1. Which other types of predicates can this technique be applied to? For example, can we show
that almost all oligarchy-type predicates are approximable, where oligarchy-type predicates
are balanced LTFs where all but a few of the inputs have the same weight?
As another example, can we extend the result of Austrin, Bennabas, and Magen that all
symmetric quadratic threshold functions with no constant term are approximable to show
that almost all quadratic threshold functions with no constant term which are symmetric
with respect to all but one variable are approximable or at least weakly approximable?
2. Our results only hold if k is sufficiently large. Is it true that all presidential type predicates
are approximable? Less ambitiously, can we either extend our techniques or develop new
techniques to handle presidential type predicates where k is relatively small?
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A Missing Proofs from Section 2
Lemma 2.1 (Restated). Let f(x1, . . . , xk) = sign(a · x1 + x2 + · · · + xk) be a presidential type
predicate where a ≤ k − 2 and a + k − 1 is an odd integer. Let fˆtC denote the Fourier coefficient
of a set of t citizens (indices from 2 to k) and fˆP+tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t
citizens together with the president (index 1). Let τ = ⌊(k − a− 1)/2⌋. We have
(1) fˆP = 1−
1
2k−2
∑τ
l=0
(
k−1
l
)
,
(2) fˆtC =
1
2k−2
∑τ
i=0
∑τ−i
j=0(−1)
j
(
k−t−1
i
)(
t
j
)
, ∀t(1 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 ∧ t is odd),
(3) fˆP+tC = −
1
2k−2
∑τ
i=0
∑τ−i
j=0(−1)
j
(
k−t−1
i
)(
t
j
)
, ∀t(2 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 ∧ t is even).
Proof of Lemma 2.1.
(1) We have
fˆP = Ex∈{−1,1}kf(x)x1 =
1
2k
∑
x∈{−1,1}k
f(x)x1.
We first choose how citizens vote. Note that if the vote is already determined by the citizens,
then the contribution to the sum is 0. Suppose that at most τ = ⌊(k − a− 1)/2⌋ citizens vote
1. Then, even if the president also votes 1, we have
a · x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xk = a+ τ − (k − 1− τ) = 2τ − (k − a− 1) < 0.
So no matter how the president votes, we always have f(x) = −1. Similarly, if at most τ
citizens vote −1, then no matter how the president votes we always have f(x) = 1. These two
cases contribute 0 to the sum. In the remaining scenarios, the vote of president determines the
result, i.e., f(x) = x1. This case contributes 1− 2 ·
1
2k−1
∑τ
l=0
(
k−1
l
)
= 1− 1
2k−2
∑τ
l=0
(
k−1
l
)
.
(2) Let I be a set of t citizens where t is an odd integer. By symmetry we have
fˆtC = Ex∈{−1,1}kf(x)xI =
1
2k
∑
x∈{−1,1}k
f(x)xI .
We analyze the sum as follows.
• x1 = 1. Assume that i citizens from {2, 3, . . . , k}−I vote 1. If i > τ , then the result is 1 no
matter how people in I vote, which means the contribution is 0. Now assume i ≤ τ . Let j
be the number of citizens from I that vote 1. Note that f(x) = 1 if and only if i+ j > τ ,
so we have f(x)xI = (−1)
t−j+1 = (−1)j if j ≤ τ − i and f(x)xI = (−1)
t−j = (−1)j+1 if
j > τ − i. The contribution in this case is
τ∑
i=0
(
k − 1− t
i
)τ−i∑
j=0
(
t
j
)
(−1)j +
t∑
j=τ−i+1
(
t
j
)
(−1)j+1

 = 2 τ∑
i=0
(
k − 1− t
i
) τ−i∑
j=0
(
t
j
)
(−1)j .
The equality comes from the fact that
∑t
j=0
(
t
j
)
(−1)j = (1− 1)t = 0.
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• x1 = −1. This case is symmetric. Note that since f and xI are both odd, we have f(x)xI =
f(−x)(−x)I . So the contribution of this case is also 2
∑τ
i=0
(
k−1−t
i
)∑τ−i
j=0
(
t
j
)
(−1)j .
Summing these contributions up, we obtain fˆtC =
1
2k−2
∑τ
i=0
∑τ−i
j=0(−1)
j
(
k−t−1
i
)(
t
j
)
.
(3) The analysis in this case is almost similar to that in item (2). Let I be a set of the president
along with t citizens where t is an even integer. We have
fˆP+tC = Ex∈{−1,1}kf(x)xI =
1
2k
∑
x∈{−1,1}k
f(x)xI .
We analyze the sum as follows.
• x1 = 1. Again assume that i citizens from {2, 3, . . . , k} − I vote 1. If i > τ , then the
contribution is 0. Now assume i ≤ τ . Let j be the number of citizens from I that vote 1.
This time we have f(x)xI = (−1)
t−j+1 = (−1)j+1 if j ≤ τ − i and f(x)xI = (−1)
t−j =
(−1)j if j > τ − i. The contribution in this case is
τ∑
i=0
(
k − 1− t
i
)τ−i∑
j=0
(
t
j
)
(−1)j+1 +
t∑
j=τ−i+1
(
t
j
)
(−1)j

 = −2 τ∑
i=0
(
k − 1− t
i
) τ−i∑
j=0
(
t
j
)
(−1)j .
• x1 = −1. Similarly, the contribution of this case is also −2
∑τ
i=0
(
k−1−t
i
)∑τ−i
j=0
(
t
j
)
(−1)j .
Summing these contributions up, we have fˆP+tC = −
1
2k−2
∑τ
i=0
∑τ−i
j=0(−1)
j
(
k−t−1
i
)(
t
j
)
.
Proposition 2.15 (Restated). For every l ≥ 1,
l!
El
S1,l = β(1 +∆)
l −
S{i1,{i1,i2}}
E
l(1 + ∆)l−1 −
βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}
E2
l(l − 1)(1 + ∆)l−2 +O
(
1
k
)
,
l!
El
S2,l = α(1 + ∆)
l +O
(
1
k
)
,
l!
El
S3,l =
βS{{α,i1}}
E
l(1 + ∆)l−1 +O
(
1
k
)
,
where the hidden constants in big-O may depend on l.
Proof of Proposition 2.15. Here we only prove the first equality since the other two can be proved
similarly. Recall that S{{i1,i2}} = E(1 + ∆) and E = Θ(k
2). The first equality is equivalent to
l!S1,l = β(S{{i1,i2}})
l−S{i1,{i1,i2}}l(S{{i1,i2}})
l−1−βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}l(l−1)(S{{i1,i2}})
l−2+O
(
k2l−1
)
.
Let’s analyze the term β(S{{i1,i2}})
l, by definition, it’s equal to

∑
i≥2
bi



 ∑
2≤i<j
bij


l
=
∑
j1,j2,...,j2l+1∈{2,3,...,k}
j2<j3,j4<j5,··· ,j2l<j2l+1
bj1bj2j3bj4j5 · · · bj2lj2l+1 .
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Let’s call the sum on the right hand side T . We classify the terms in T according to number of
repetitions in indices. If there is no repetition, then the term bj1bj2j3bj4j5 · · · bj2lj2l+1 is also in S1,l.
Note that in S1,l the order of the l pairwise biases can be arbitrary, so the sum of terms with no
repeated indices is equal to l!S1,l. If there are two or more repetitions, then the number of distinct
indices is at most 2l − 1, and the contribution of such terms is O(k2l−1). If there is exact one
repetition, then there are two cases.
• j1 is equal to some jt for t ≥ 2. Without loss of generality consider the terms where the only
repetition is j1 = j2 or j1 = j3 (note that j2 < j3). The contribution of these terms are∑
j1,j2,...,j2l+1∈{2,3,...,k}
j2<j3,j4<j5,··· ,j2l<j2l+1
j1=j2 or j1=j3
j2,j3,...,j2l+1 distinct
bj1bj2j3bj4j5 · · · bj2lj2l+1 =
∑
j1,j2,...,j2l+1∈{2,3,...,k}
j2<j3,j4<j5,··· ,j2l<j2l+1
j1=j2 or j1=j3
bj1bj2j3bj4j5 · · · bj2lj2l+1 +O(k
2l−1)
= S{i1,{i1,i2}}(S{{i1,i2}})
l−1 +O(k2l−1).
This is because the terms where j2, j3, . . . , j2l+1 are not distinct have at most 2l − 1 distinct
indices and contribute O(k2l−1). So the contribution of this case is
lS{i1,{i1,i2}}(S{{i1,i2}})
l−1 +O(k2l−1).
• js = jt for some s, t ≥ 2. Note that in this case s and t cannot appear in the same pairwise
bias. Without loss of generality assume s ∈ {2, 3} and t ∈ {4, 5}. We have∑
j1,j2,...,j2l+1∈{2,3,...,k}
j2<j3,j4<j5,··· ,j2l<j2l+1
one repetition in j2,j3,j4,j5
other indices distinct
bj1bj2j3bj4j5 · · · bj2lj2l+1 =
∑
j1,j2,...,j2l+1∈{2,3,...,k}
j2<j3,j4<j5,··· ,j2l<j2l+1
one repetition in j2,j3,j4,j5
bj1bj2j3bj4j5 · · · bj2lj2l+1 +O(k
2l−1)
= 2βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}(S{{i1,i2}})
l−2 +O(k2l−1).
So the contribution of this case is(
l
2
)
·
(
2βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}(S{{i1,i2}})
l−2 +O(k2l−1)
)
= βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}l(l − 1)(S{{i1 ,i2}})
l−2 +O
(
k2l−1
)
.
We conclude that
β(S{{i1,i2}})
l = l!S1,l+ lS{i1,{i1,i2}}(S{{i1,i2}})
l−1+βS{{i1,i2},{i1,i3}}l(l−1)(S{{i1,i2}})
l−2+O
(
k2l−1
)
.
We get the desired equality by shifting the terms.
B Proof of Lemma 4.1
We first prove some combinatorial identities to be used later.
Proposition B.1. For t, l ∈ N, we have
l∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
t
j
)
= (−1)l ·
(
t− 1
l
)
.
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Proof. We prove by induction on l. If l = 0, then LHS = 1 = RHS. For l ≥ 1, we have
l∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
t
j
)
= (−1)l−1 ·
(
t− 1
l − 1
)
+ (−1)l
(
t
l
)
= (−1)l−1 ·
(
t− 1
l − 1
)
+ (−1)l
((
t− 1
l − 1
)
+
(
t− 1
l
))
= (−1)l ·
(
t− 1
l
)
.
Proposition B.2. For a, b ∈ R, k ∈ N, we have
1.
∑k
i=0
(
k
i
)
ai−1bk−ii(i+ 1) = 2k(a+ b)k−1 + k(k − 1)a(a+ b)k−2.
2.
∑k
i=0
(
k
i
)
aibk−i−1(k − i)(k − i+ 1) = 2k(a+ b)k−1 + k(k − 1)b(a + b)k−2.
Proof. We have
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
ai−1bk−ii(i+ 1) =
∂2
∂2a
(
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
ai+1bk−i
)
=
∂2
∂2a
(
a(a+ b)k
)
= 2k(a+ b)k−1 + k(k − 1)a(a + b)k−2.
This gives Item 1. By substituting i with k − i and swapping a and b in Item 1 we get Item 2.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1 (Restated). Let f(x1, . . . , xk) = sign(δ · kx1+x2+ · · ·+xk) where δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
δk+ k− 1 is an odd integer. Let u = 1+δ2 k and v =
1−δ
2 k. Let fˆtC denote the Fourier coefficient of
a set of t citizens and fˆP+tC denote the Fourier coefficient of a set of t citizens together with the
president. We have
fˆP = 1−
1
2k−2
v−1∑
l=0
(
k − 1
l
)
,
fˆtC =
1
2k−2
·
(k − t− 1)!
(u− 1)!(v − 1)!
(
δt−1kt−1 −
(t− 1)(t− 2)
2
δt−3kt−2 +O(kt−3)
)
, t is an odd constant
fˆP+tC = −
1
2k−2
·
(k − t− 1)!
(u− 1)!(v − 1)!
(
δt−1kt−1 −
(t− 1)(t− 2)
2
δt−3kt−2 +O(kt−3)
)
, t is an even constant
where the constants inside the big Os depend on t but not on δ.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. We have τ = ⌊(k − δk − 1)/2⌋ = v − 1. It follows from Lemma 2.1 that
fˆP = 1−
1
2k−2
v−1∑
l=0
(
k − 1
l
)
,
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fˆtC =
1
2k−2
v−1∑
i=0
v−1−i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k − t− 1
i
)(
t
j
)
, ∀t(1 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 ∧ t is odd),
fˆP+tC = −
1
2k−2
v−1∑
i=0
v−1−i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k − t− 1
i
)(
t
j
)
, ∀t(2 ≤ t ≤ k − 1 ∧ t is even).
We have
v−1∑
i=0
v−1−i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
k − t− 1
i
)(
t
j
)
=
v−1∑
i=0
(
k − t− 1
i
)v−1−i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
t
j
)
=
v−1∑
i=0
(
k − t− 1
i
)
(−1)v−1−i
(
t− 1
v − 1− i
)
=
v−1∑
i=v−t
(
k − t− 1
i
)
(−1)v−1−i
(
t− 1
v − 1− i
)
.
The second to last equaltiy comes from Proposition B.1, and the last equality comes from the fact
that
(
t−1
v−1−i
)
= 0 if t− 1 < v − 1− i. For v − t ≤ i ≤ v − 1 we have(
k − t− 1
i
)
=
(k − t− 1)!
i!(k − t− 1− i)!
=
(k − t− 1)!
(u− 1)!(v − 1)!
· (i+ 1)(i + 2) · · · (v − 1)(k − t− i)(k − t− i+ 1) · · · (u− 1)
=
(k − t− 1)!
(u− 1)!(v − 1)!
v−1−i∏
l=1
(v − l)
t−v+i∏
l=1
(u− l).
Here we used the fact that u = k − v. By substituting i with v − 1− i we get
v−1∑
i=v−t
(
k − t− 1
i
)
(−1)v−1−i
(
t− 1
v − 1− i
)
=
(k − t− 1)!
(u− 1)!(v − 1)!
t−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
t− 1
i
) i∏
l=1
(v − l)
t−1−i∏
l=1
(u− l) .
We need to estimate the sum
∑t−1
i=0(−1)
i
(
t−1
i
)∏i
l=1 (v − l)
∏t−1−i
l=1 (u− l). Since u =
1+δ
2 k,
v = 1−δ2 k and t is a constant, this sum is a polynomial in k with degree t − 1. The degree t − 1
term is
t−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
t− 1
i
)
viut−1−i = (u− v)t−1 = δt−1kt−1.
Note that degree t−2 term is formed by taking one l in one of the factors in
∏i
l=1 (v − l)
∏t−1−i
l=1 (u− l)
and taking u or v in the remaining factors, so it is
t−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
t− 1
i
)(
viut−i−2
t−1−i∑
l=1
(−l) + vi−1ut−1−i
i∑
l=1
(−l)
)
=
t−1∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
t− 1
i
)(
−viut−i−2 ·
(t− 1− i)(t− i)
2
− vi−1ut−1−i ·
i(i+ 1)
2
)
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=(
(t− 1)(u − v)t−2 −
1
2
(t− 1)(t− 2)v(u − v)t−3
)
−
(
(t− 1)(u − v)t−2 +
1
2
(t− 1)(t− 2)u(u − v)t−3
)
= −
1
2
(t− 1)(t− 2)(u+ v)(u− v)t−3
= −
1
2
(t− 1)(t− 2)δt−3kt−2.
Hence, the lemma follows.
C Converting Non-integer Coefficient to Integer Coefficient
In this section, we show that the assumption that the coefficient of the president is integer is not
a serious restriction by proving the following theorem.
Lemma C.1. Let δ be a constant with 0 < δ < 1. There exists a function δ′ = δ′(k) such that
δ′ · k ∈ N and
sign
(
δkx1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
= sign
(
δ′kx1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
for every k ∈ N and x ∈ {−1, 1}k.
Proof. If δk is already an integer, then let δ′(k) = δ. Otherwise, there exists m ∈ N such that
δk ∈ (m,m+ 1). We will choose δ′(k) = m/k or (m+ 1)/k depending on the following: if k − 1 is
even, we choose δ′(k) · k to be odd, and if k − 1 is odd, we choose δ′(k) · k to be even. Note that
the range of δ′kx1 +
∑k
i=2 xi is
R = {δ′k + k − 1, δ′k + k − 3, . . . , δ′k − k + 1,−δ′k + k − 1, δ′k + k − 3, . . . , δ′k − k + 1}.
By our choice of δ′, every t ∈ R is odd and therefore |t| ≥ 1. For every x ∈ {−1, 1}k , we have∣∣∣∣∣
(
δkx1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
−
(
δ′kx1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)∣∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣δkx1 − δ′kx1∣∣ = ∣∣δk − δ′k∣∣ < 1,
which implies that
sign
(
δkx1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
= sign
(
δ′kx1 +
k∑
i=2
xi
)
.
What we essentially did here is that we rounded δk to either below or above. Note that this
gives |δ′(k)− δ| ≤ 1/k, which means when k is sufficiently large, δ′ and δ will be very close to each
other.
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